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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RUTH ETHEL DRURY MARSHALL,
et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Case No. 8792

GEORGE T. TAYLER,
Defendant and Appellant.

PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an action for personal injuries arising out of the
alleged tortious act of defendant, the plaintiffs prevailed,
upon a verdict of the jury and entry of judgment by the
lower court.
Upon appeal by defendant the verdict of the jury
and the judgment of the lower court were reversed by
this court in its decision filed July 7, 1958, and the plain-
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tiffs herewith petition this court for rehearing upon that
decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as set forth in defendant's
brief on appeal as modified by the statements of facts
contained in the plaintiffs' brief on appeal is herewith
incorporated in this Petition for Rehearing.
STATE~1:ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THIS COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFFS
TO HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT OR HAVING ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY TO THEMSELVES
IN THAT IT DID NOT CONSTRUE THE EVIDENCE IN
THE MOST FAVO·RABLE LIGHT FOR PLAINTIFFS. FURTHERMORE, EVEN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF RISK ORIGINALLY, THE DEFENDANT HAD
THE LAST CLEAR CI-IANCE TO A VOID INJURING PLAINTIFFS AND, HAVING DISCOVERED THEM IN A POSITION
OF PERIL, HE WAS UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE
REASONABLE CARE FOR THEIR SAFETY.
POINT II.
BY ITS DECISION IN THIS CASE THE SUPREME
COURT HAS USURPED THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY
AND THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO LA"\\T.
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ARGU~IENT

POINT I.
THIS COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFFS
TO HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT OR HAVING ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY TO THEMSELVES
IN THAT IT DID NOT CONSTRUE THE EVIDENCE IN
THE MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT FOR PLAINTIFFS. FURTHERMORE, EVEN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF RISK ORIGINALLY, THE DEFENDANT HAD
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE TO AVOID INJURING PLAINTIFFS AND, HAVING DISCOVERED THEM IN A POSITION
OF PERIL, HE WAS UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE
REASONABLE CARE FOR THEIR SAFETY.

This court is charged with the responsibility of construing the evidence in a case upon appeal most favorably
to the successful party in the lower court. Thompson v.
Aldrich, 5 U.2d 99, 297 P.2d 226; Pantages v. Arge, 1
U.2d 105, 262 P.2d 745; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §
1574. This the court did not do in this case. Quite to the
contrary, this court has concluded that the plaintiffs could
have released their holds on the door handles of defendant's automobile during that split second when the automobile was necessarily stopped in changing from a weaving reverse direction to a weaving forward movement.
This conclusion has been reached in direct opposition
to the plaintiffs' claim, amply supported by four witnesses, that the plaintiffs were knocked from their feet by
the defendant's sudden "\Veaving backward thrust and
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were dragged backward in such a manner as to be unable
to regain their balance. The instantaneous forward movement of the automobile did not afford the plaintiffs an
opportunity to regain their balance such that they would
be in a position to let go of the car handles and remove
themselves from the danger of falling under the wheels
of the automobile. (Tr. 121-122, 161-162, 262-263, 281-282).
The medical testimony of the attending physician corroborated the statement of witnesses that the plaintiff Mrs.
Tayler suffered cuts and bruises to her knees and toes
and that both feet ha~ abrasions with foreign matter
ground into them which was present on the top portion
of the instep of the foot and the toes. (Tr. 216). Mr.
Marshall testified that he observed the flesh was torn
from her knee with gravel ground therein and that both
toe nails had been torn off with the flesh ground away
to the bone. ( Tr. 129). Tlris testin1ony itself is absolutely
indicative of the fact that :Nlrs. Tayler \Vas dragged by
the automobile and was not attempting to stop the auto's
movement. The injuries to the upper parts of the toes
and knees are conclusive in corroborating the testimony
that these plaintiffs were knocked fron1 their feet and
literally dragged by the defendant's auton1obile. _._.\nd it is
equally as certain that these plaintiffs could not have
arighted the1nselves or disengaged then1selves from the
car without risking nnnlediate death fronl the \\reaving
wheels of the auto1nobile 'vhether in its bark,vard or forward 1notion, or even in that frag1nentary split second
in which, pursuant to the la"T of physies~ this 1nodern car
may have stopped in its baclnvard motion in order to
proceed forward. This conclusion 'vas reached by the
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trial judge and jury with a first hand knowledge of the
testimony. Furthermore, it is apparently conceded by
this court that no error was made in the instructions to
the jury upon contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. Under these circumstances, this court is obligated
to construe the evidence most favorably to the plaintiffs,
and such a construction would most certainly require an
affirmation of the lower court's judgment.
The court, as part of its opinion, states that "Mr.
Marshall admitted that the car backed up and stopped before going forward." Actually he testified upon cross
examination as follows (Tr. 142-143):

"Q.

Now when the car got down here, and stopped
for a minute before it went forwardA. I did not see it stop, no.
Well were you watching all the time~
A. I told it. I said before because of the dust, I
could not see it come to a full stop."
Q.

Thus it is clear beyond question that Mr. Marshall admitted the car stopped as a function of physical inertia, BUT
HE DID NO'T SEE THE CAR STOP BECAUSE HE
WAS PREVENTED FROM SO DOING BY THE
CLOUD OF DUST RAISED BY THE AUTOMOBILE'S
UNUSUAL AND RECKLESS MOVEMENT. (Tr. 121122). Be that as it may, Mrs. Tayler testified as follows:
"I had hold of the handle, and it swept me off
my feet. Before I could get my bearings, he went
back and forth, he weaved, I could not let go, I
would have been run over .... Yes, it all happened
so fast, like I said, he started with a jerk, and
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weaved to the side, I lost my balance, and then he
weaved to the other side, he backed up, at no time
d~d he stop to my recollection, he never stopped.
He came forward weaving back and forth. I could
not let go, I would have gone under one of the
wheels if I had of. All of a sudden, I hit an object." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 161-162.)
In all sincerity, and with due respect to this Honorable ·Court, after examining and re-examining the record
and the law, we find it impossible to reconcile the same
with the decision of this Court. Instead of construing
the evidence in the most favorable light for the plaintiffs,
(the prevailing parties) as the law uniformly requires,
and as justice and the needs of society dictate, this Court
has construed the evidence most favorably to, and in
entire accord with the contentions of the defendant.
FURTHERMORE, even assuming that the plaintiffs
were contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk
of injury to themselves by not letting loose of the door
handles at the moment this court considered most appropriate, still this court was in error in not sustaining
the judgment of the loV\rer court upon the doctrine of last
clear chance or the rule that, after discovery of the peril
brought on by one's o'V"Il trespass, contributory negligence or assun1ption of risk, the person in charge of the
instrumentality causing the dan1age is then duty-bound
to exercise reasonable care and caution for the safety
of such a one. It is a 'vell estabished rule, recognized in
practically every jurisdiction, and variously referred to
as "the doctrine of the last clear chance," "the humanitarian doctrine," and "the doctrine of discovered peril," that
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there may be a recovery for injuries sustained, notwithstanding plaintiff negligently exposed himself or his
property to the danger from which the injury complained
of arose, if defendant failed to exercise ordinary care
to avoid the injury after becoming aware that the person
was in a position of peril. See voluminous lists of authority in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 136. See also Beckstrom v.
WiJlliJams, 3 U.2d 210, 282 P.2d 309; Theurer v. Holland
Furnace Company, C.C.A. Utah, 124 F. 2d 494; Lawrence
v. Bamberger R. Co., 3 U.2d 247, 282 P.2d 335; Compton
v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 120 U. 453, 235 P.2d
515; Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 9 U. 228, 33 P.
1042; Everett v. Oregon S. L. Ry. Co., 9 U. 340, 34 P. 289;
Hall v. Ogden City Street Ry. Co., 13 U. 243, 44 P. 1046;
TBakle v. San Pedro, L.A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 U. 276, 90 P.
402; Knutson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 78 U. 145, 2
P.2d 102.
In the Beckstrom case, supra, this court held:
"The general principle of the last clear .chance
doctrine has been accepted in Utah from early
times and is firmly established in our law. Its most
obvious appli,cation is in cases where the plaint~ff
is in inextricable peril. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
The facts of this case make the application of the rule
most obvious. Even assuming that the plaintiffs were
contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk of injury to themselves by not releasing the door handles at
the time the automobile concluded its backward motion,
there can be no question that defendant was thereafter
aware of their presence on the automobile and was aware
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of their peril as he proceeded forward. The weaving and
zigzagging previously referred to was aimed directly at
dislodging the plaintiffs from their precarious positions
in being dragged while holding the door handles of the
automobile. Furthermore, it was testified on behalf of
plaintiffs that there was no reason for defendant to drive
under the canopy of the service station. (Tr. 151, 163164). The fact that one plaintiff was slammed against a
cola vending machine and the other against a gas pump
as a result of this choice of direction by defendant is too
far outside the reahn of chance to have been accidental.
The defendant himself testified that the plaintiffs were
hanging on to his car handles (Tr. 335, 336). He also
testified "I looked to the. side of me, and it seemed to me,
I saw Fern drop off." (Tr. 295). Also, "I saw Ruth's
head bouncing up and down" (Tr. 295), and "I pulled
along and I kept on going, until Ruth finally saw I was
going, and she let go, and when she did, I knew she had
made a mistake." (Tr. 296).
The defendant therefore admits that he was aware
of the peril of plaintiffs after he proceeded forward. He
further states that when Mrs. Marshall finally did let go
of the car handles, he "knew she had made a mistake."
Thus even the defendant recognized that her choice left
little but disaster for her, by implying that she would
have made a wiser choice by continuing to hold on to the
door handle as the defendant headed for the open road
at full throttle.
There can be no doubt that this case is classically
adapted to the "obvious application" of the last clear
chance doctrine, and this court erred in not so holding.
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In our appeal brief we brought to the court's attention a recent Florida case similar to the one at bar, with
facts even more detrimental to the prevailing plaintiffs
than in this case. In that case, Byers v. Gunn, 81 So. 2d
723, the defendant's minor daughter, while driving her
father's automobile, had stopped at a stop street. Four
youngsters, including the plaintiff, approached the car
and asked for a ride, which was refused. The daughter
rolled up the windows and locked the doors, whereupon
the four intruders sat down on the front fenders and hood
of the car. The driver started the car in motion and, after
attaining speeds up to 40 miles per hour, stepped on the
brake causing the plaintiff to be thrown off and severely
injured. The Supreme Court of Florida, affirming the
lower court, allowed the plaintiff to recover upon averdict of negligence. In so holding the court stated:
"The injured girl was a trespasser and the
trial judge so informed the jury. The rule of law
is clear that the standard of care owed to a trespasser is to refrain from committing a willful or
wanton injury. This rule, however, gives way to
the further proposition that after discovery of the
peril to a trespasser, the driver of the automobile
is then duty-bound to exercise reasonable care and
caution under the circumstances. Absent contributory negligence on the part of the injured person there would appear to be no justifiable excuse
for injuring a person in a position of manifest
peril if such injury can be reasonably avoided, or
as otherwise stated, if such injury can be avoided
by the exercise of reasonable care and caution
in the light of all the circumstances in the particular case."
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The court further held in thiJs case that vt could not be
concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, and that
the court w~as not justifi,ed in substituting iJts judgment
forthatofthejury.
The above authorities are unanimously in accord
with the decision of the lower court in this case, and we
feel that a fair interpretation of the facts as introduced
at the trial, even without the indulgence of this court in
viewing the evidence most favorably for plaintiffs as it is
required to do, would lead this court to the inevitable
conclusion that its previous decision was contrary to law
and fact.
POINT II.
BY ITS DECISION IN THIS CASE THE SUPREME
COURT HAS USURPED THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY
AND THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO LAW.

It is elemental that questions as to the credibility,
weight, and value of evidence are primarily for the jury
and secondarily for the trial court, and, in the absence of
a clear abuse of discretion, are not, on appeal, a matter
for review. A verdict approved by the trial court, if
without legal error and supported by the evidence, is conclusive on appeal. The general rule is that the appellate
court cannot invade the province of the jury with respect
to determining the facts, and the verdict of the jury as
dependent on the evidence is ordinarily taken as conclusive on the appellate court. 5A C.J.S., Appeal & Error,
§§ 1647, 1653, and cases therein cited. Likewise the gen-
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eral rule precluding interference by the appellate court
with a fact determination of the jury supported by evidence applies with respect to findings in regard to assumption of risk, or as to contributory negligence in actions based on negligence. Thus in the case of Malizia
v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 U. 122, 178 P. 756, the
court held that even though it might entertain doubts as
to whether the conduct of plaintiff's decedent in passing
in front of defendant's engine in going over a public
crossing was excusable, yet it must yield to the judgment
of the jury. See also Byers v. Gunn, supra.
There can be no question that there was ample evidence by plaintiffs' witnesses upon which the jury could
find that there was no contributory negligence by plaintiffs. The jury found that the defendant did not use due
care for the safety of plaintiffs (R. 83, 86) and that plaintiffs did not assume the risk of injury to themselves
(R. 84, 88), nor were they contributorily negligent (R.
84, 87). The trial court entered judgment accordingly.
It is manifestly unjust and contrary to law for this
Court to have usurped the function of the jury in this
case. One might ask why there was any need of a jury or
the trial court proceedings at all in this action. An appellate court never sees or hears \vitnesses, knows nothing
of their demeanor, which is frequently a determining
factor as to their credibility, and can determine facts
only on the basis of the cold written word. In the absence
of error of law, on the part of the trial court or the jury,
in eliciting testimony, is there any basis, in la-vv or reason,
upon which an appellate court can properly set itself as
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a trier of facts and substitute itself for the jury~ It
appears to us that this Court has done just that.
This Court did not recite one single error of law in
its decision. It does not question the sufficiency of the
lower court's instructions as to any material matter. The
opinion states in one breath that there can be no argument
with the jury's findings as to wilfulness or wantonness
on the part of the defendant (a point in favor of defendant) and then promptly breathes the kiss of death upon
the verdict and judgment of the jury as to the questions
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk by
substituting its own judgment for that of the jury on
these matters. This we say it cannot, or should not, do in
accordance with the established rules of law in these
particulars.
CONCLL~SION

If our argument herein appears to be unusually
vigorous, it should not be taken as anything but a sincere
conviction of the correctness of our position, coupled
with a realization that, at times, even Supreme Court
Justices may be in error. If our position is correct, \Ye
feel assured that this Court \\ill rectify the error and
reverse its former decision, even though to do so may
necessitate further deter1nination of other 1natters of la\Y
in order to conclude this action.
In our humble opinion, this Court's present determination of factual n1atters violates four eoncepts of la\\~, as
follows:
(1) It is not sustained by the "~eight of the endenee, as "'"as the ,Jury's finding.
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(2) It is not based upon a construction of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs who
prevailed in the lower court.
(3) It does not recognize the doctrine of last clear
chance or discovered peril.
(4) It usurps and invades the province of the
JUry.

Respectfully submitted,

ROMNEY & NELSON
DONN E. CASSITY
JACK L. CRELLIN
Attorney$ for Respondents.
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